Pets and dependency by du Toit, Jessica
 Pets and Dependency 
Jessica du Toit wonders if our relationship with our pets can be 
morally defended 
Many of us share our lives and homes with dogs, cats, birds, and fish, among other 
animals, all of whom we have traditionally referred to as ‘pets’. It is unsurprising, then, 
that the question of how humans ought to treat these animals is the subject of a growing 
number of philosophical discussion. What is surprising, however, is that the question of 
whether it is permissible for humans to have pets has received less philosophical 
attention. Here, I want to consider one objection to the practice of having pets—what I 
shall call the ‘dependency objection’. (I’m going to assume that those who have pets can 
be relied upon to take good care of their pets.) 
One terminological issue ought to be addressed first. Calling an animal a ‘pet’ has come 
to suggest ownership of the relevant animal, and this idea of ownership may well foster 
inappropriate attitudes to toward the animal called ‘pet’. For example, it may foster the 
attitude that ‘property’ is an appropriate category in which to place the animal called ‘pet’: 
in the same way that to place a human being in the category of property is to impugn the 
moral status or intrinsic value of that human being, to place a ‘pet’ in this category is to 
impugn the moral status or intrinsic value of that animal. 
Thus, even if these beings suffer no physical harm as a result of their being categorized 
as property, their being categorized in this way might nonetheless be said to wrong them. 
For this reason, some authors prefer the term ‘companion animal’ to ‘pet’. I shall follow 
these authors and henceforth refer to those animals traditionally called pets as 
companion animals. 
While I agree with those who argue that we ought not to categorize companion animals 
as property and that we ought to bring an end to the practice of owning companion 
animals, the question I am interested in is whether we ought also to aim at ending the 
practice of keeping companion animals. In other words, is it morally permissible to bring 
companion animals into existence merely to keep them, even if we do not own them? 
According to Gary Francione, if the legal status of companion animals were changed so 
that they no longer fell into the category of property, humans would have a moral 
obligation to continue to care for those companion animals who already exist. Further, we 
would also be obliged to ensure that no more of these animals were brought into 
existence. This is because he thinks that there is something inherently wrong with 
keeping companion animals and not merely with owning them. 
In Francione’s view, the inherent wrongfulness has to do with the fact that companion 
animals are domesticated. Domesticated animals are much more docile and trusting than 
the wild animals from whom they descended. While this renders them better suited to 
living with, or in close proximity to, humans, it also renders them almost entirely 
dependent on humans for the satisfaction of their fundamental needs and desires. To be 
so dependent on another is to be in a position of extreme vulnerability. And to find 
oneself in this position is to run a very high risk of leading a short and miserable life. For 
this reason, the argument goes, it is morally indefensible to place or allow another 
creature to be placed in such a position and thus we ought not breed companion animals 
or even allow them to reproduce with one another. 
Although it is true that companion animals are at the mercy of their human keepers, the 
caring and reliable keepers with whom I am concerned are precisely the kind of keepers 
who can be relied upon to satisfy their companion animals’ needs and desires (to the 
greatest extent possible). Thus, if the dependency objection is to make any sense in 
these cases, it must be because, irrespective of whether the relevant animals’ needs and 
desires are met, it is morally unconscionable that companion animals are so dependent 
on their respective keepers. 
The practice of having pets is so well established in our society that it would be surprising 
if we did not have some difficulty appreciating why merely keeping companion animals 
might be morally problematic. In light of this, some might suggest that we imagine a 
programme of breeding severely cognitively impaired humans who could be kept around 
the home as companions. Such humans would, like companion animals, be permanently 
dependent on their keepers for almost everything. 
The vast majority of people would, I’m sure, have moral qualms about this. But is the 
worry here that there is something inherently morally troubling about a being’s perpetual 
dependency on another for almost everything, or is it something else? For example, we 
might think this is problematic because it is morally wrong to deliberately breed severely 
impaired humans. 
Perhaps, then, we should instead imagine a hypothetical situation in which someone 
breeds genetically altered chimpanzees who are ill suited to living in the wild, but well 
suited to living with, or in close proximity to, humans. These domesticated chimpanzees 
would have mental capacities equivalent to those of wild chimpanzees, and thus would 
not be cognitively impaired. They would, however, be much less aggressive and more 
docile than their wild relatives. Since they would be unable to live independently of 
humans, the domesticated chimpanzees would be perpetually dependant on humans for 
the satisfaction of their fundamental needs and desires. Is there something morally 
problematic about creating a breed of such chimpanzees? 
Intuitions about this case will likely clash. While some might see nothing wrong with 
choosing to breed a new kind creature who will be perpetually dependent on another, 
provided that this other satisfies its needs and desires, others might have the intuition 
that it is morally problematic to do so even if the creature will be well cared for. 
What can be said in the face of these conflicting intuitions? Some might argue that since 
proponents of the dependency objection wish to change people’s practices, they must 
bear the burden of proof. As they don’t seem to have provided a compelling argument for 
their position, it might be thought that we are entitled to dismiss the dependency 
objection. However, it is just not clear that proponents of the objection do in fact bear the 
burden of proof. This clash of intuitions suggests that we simply cannot evaluate the 
dependency objection. So although it would be preferable to resolve this matter, it is 
entirely possible that there is no resolution available (at least at present). If that is the 
case, we should not artificially impose or stipulate one. Thus, it is unclear whether we 
ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping companion animals. 
Since there are currently far too many companion animals who are brought into 
existence but never homed, and since this situation is unlikely to change in the near 
future, our most pressing moral obligations seem to me to be clear: until such time as the 
demand for companion animals exceeds the number of these animals already in 
existence, we ought to continue to care for those companion animals who already exist, 
but to desist from breeding these animals and from allowing them to reproduce with one 
another. 
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